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Anti-dumping policies in the EU and trade diversion ☆

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Abstract

Anti-dumping actions are by nature discriminatory. Imports from targeted countries are discriminated against relative to domestic producers but also relative to imports from non-named countries in the rest of the world. This paper analyses the impact of anti-dumping actions in the EU, distinguishing between the impact upon named countries, non-named countries in the rest of the world and non-named countries in the EU. The results suggest that anti-dumping policies cause trade diversion and that this diversion is primarily to non-EU suppliers. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of EU anti-dumping measures. Anti-dumping actions are by nature discriminatory. Imports from targeted countries are discriminated against relative to domestic producers in the EU,

☆ Information on anti-dumping cases are taken from various editions of *The Annual Report from the Commission to the European Parliament on the Community's Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Activities* and the relevant issues of the *Official Journal of the European Communities*. The trade data were obtained from the *Comext* database of Eurostat.

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and also relative to non-named extra-EU countries.[1] It is therefore not necessarily the case that firms initiating anti-dumping procedures will be beneficiaries of restrictions on imports from the named countries. Trade can be diverted to other suppliers in the EU and to non-named suppliers in the rest of the world. In this case, the effect of the removal of the duties or the ending of price undertakings will be felt beyond the complainant firms.

The focus of this paper is to assess the extent of trade diversion associated with EU anti-dumping actions. Previous empirical studies suggest that trade diversion has been important in the EU in the 1980s (Messerlin, 1989) and in the US (Prusa, 1997). The first section of the paper provides a simple graphical analysis of the economic impact of EU anti-dumping actions on trade within the EU, imports from named countries and imports from other countries in the rest of the world. The paper then proceeds to an econometric analysis of trade diversion in EU anti-dumping policies. A final section provides conclusions.

2. The economic impact of EU anti-dumping actions

This section considers whether the trade restrictions (or undertakings) divert trade to non-named countries, either in the EU or in the rest of the world. I use data for a range of cases initiated between 1989 and 1994.[2] In total, there are 98 anti-dumping cases involving 47 products.[3] Of these, 31 cases resulted in no further action due to lack of dumping, lack of injury, or 'other reasons'. Overall, during this period 193 cases were initiated but some cases against countries of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are excluded due to the absence of comparable trade data over time. Also excluded are investigations involving reviews of existing cases and cases where anti-dumping measures were currently or previously in force, since the pre-announcement data will be clouded by the earlier actions. Thus, here we look at first investigations of dumping and exclude cases where trade flows may be affected by existing or previous actions. A small number of regional investigations, that is, cases relating to a single member of the EU, are also excluded.[4]

[1] There are cases where all significant suppliers of a product are named in an anti-dumping petition.

[2] Cases prior to 1989 have previously been analysed by Messerlin (1989). Thus, our sample is completely different to that of Messerlin and so this study provides an assessment of the robustness of the results presented in that paper.

[3] We use trade data at the eight-digit level of the HS. When the anti-dumping action refers to a number of eight-digit codes we sum across these, rather than include them all individually, since the aggregate is the relevant market.

[4] More precise details of the products and suppliers covered by these cases are available from the author.



Fig. 1. Changes in import values and anti-dumping in the EU ($t_0 = 100$).e

Where measures (ad valorem duties, specific duties, minimum prices, or price undertakings) were applied, the average unweighted duty (including ad valorem equivalents of specific duties) exceeded 25%.[5] This suggests that anti-dumping measures are likely to have a major impact upon trade. The average duty is considerably higher than the level of tariff protection affecting most products, with the exception of agricultural goods and products such as tobacco and alcoholic drinks. The average tariff for industrial products entering the EU during this period was around 5% to 6%.

The products figuring most prominently in the anti-dumping cases were mineral products and chemicals (Sections 25 to 29 of the Harmonised System), primarily organic chemicals, and machinery and equipment (Sections 84 and 85), mainly electrical machinery and equipment. These products accounted for over half of the cases that are considered in this paper. Countries targeted in cases involving electrical machinery and equipment were typically in the Far East, with Japan and the NICs (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) being most commonly cited.

Fig. 1 shows the impact of anti-dumping cases on the value of EU(12) imports over a period beginning 2 years before the investigation is initiated and ending 4 years after this date. Provisional duties are typically applied in the first year after the investigation is initiated, with definitive duties or other measures, if sanctioned, normally being levied in the following year. We distinguish between (1)

[5] For price undertakings we use, where available, the duty determined in the investigation but not subsequently applied.



Fig. 2. Changes in import volumes and anti-dumping in the EU ($t_0 = 100$).

imports from countries that are named in an anti-dumping petition, and are subsequently subject to restrictive measures of some kind, (2) those countries that are named but where measures are not imposed, and (3) imports from other countries, firstly, in the EU and, secondly, in the rest of the world, which are not named in the petition. The figure shows the unweighted[6] average (across all of the cases considered) change in imports relative to the year in which the investigation is initiated (t_0). Figs. 2 and 3 show the average changes in import volumes and in import prices, as proxied by unit values (value per unit of volume).

These figures suggest a number of observations.

· There is no significant decline, on average, in the value or volume of intra-EU imports in the year preceding anti-dumping cases (Figs. 1 and 2). Thus, the observed increase in the value and volume of imports from named countries, in the year before the action is initiated, is not at the expense of a fall in the value of intra-EU imports. Of course, what matters in anti-dumping cases is the value of domestic sales by EU firms. Unfortunately, such data are not available but we return to discuss this issue later.

· Following a rise in the first year after the action is initiated,[7] there is a large decline (over 20%) in the value of imports from named countries as duties or other

[6] Weighting the value of imports for each case by the total of all imports subject to investigation made little difference to the averages that are presented.

[7] This could reflect issues of timing since our data, and so our analysis, is based upon calendar years. Hence, we cannot distinguish between actions initiated in January and those in December. The pattern of imports in the years after the initiation of the action may also reflect variations in the time taken before the imposition of first, provisional, and then definitive duties.



Fig. 3. Changes in import unit values and anti-dumping in the EU ($t_0 = 100$).

measures are imposed. The fall in the volume of imports is slightly more pronounced. This relatively low level of imports is then maintained in the subsequent 2 years (Figs. 1 and 2).

- As imports from named countries decline, there is a surge in the value of imports from non-named countries in the rest of the world. The value of intra-EU imports grows but at a much slower rate than imports from outside of the EU.[8] Thus, *trade diversion away from countries subject to anti-dumping measures appears to be primarily to non-EU countries.*
- Imports from countries that are named in an anti-dumping petition, but which are not subsequently subject to measures, also appear to be affected, with the value of imports remaining relatively constant in the 2 years following the announcement of the investigation. The value and the volume of such imports increase in the third year after the investigation is initiated (Figs. 1 and 2).
- The prices of imports from extra-EU sources (both named and non-named) fall in the year before the anti-dumping action is initiated, as does the price of intra-EU imports. It would therefore appear that movements in prices rather than in trade values and trade volumes trigger dumping complaints in the EU (Fig. 3).
- The initiation of the anti-dumping procedures appears to interfere with the trend movements in prices; the price of imports from named countries subject to measures increases substantially relative to the year of initiation, whilst the price of extra-EU imports from non-named countries and EU import prices stabilise. In

[8] In fact, the increase in intra-EU imports occurs in the year after the decline in imports from named countries.



Fig. 4. Changes in import value shares and anti-dumping in the EU ($t_0 = 100$).

the fourth year after the action was initiated, prices fall back, with the price of intra-EU imports almost identical to that when the investigation was initiated (Fig. 3).

The averages presented in these first three figures typically have a very large associated standard error, reflecting in part the different magnitude of imports for the various anti-dumping cases. In Figs. 4 and 5, the data are normalised by



Fig. 5. Changes in import volume shares and anti-dumping in the EU ($t_0 = 100$).

looking at the average of changes in the share of the EU market for imports (intra-EU imports + extra-EU imports), in terms of both value and volume. These figures are likely to be less prone to the influence of extreme trade values or volumes. The figures show the difference in percentage points in market share relative to the base year in which the action was initiated. Both Fig. 4, for value shares, and Fig. 5, for the volume share, clearly show that the principal effect of anti-dumping actions is to raise the share of total EU imports of non-named countries in the rest of the world at the expense of suppliers subject to anti-dumping measures. There is a very slight rise in the share of intra-EU imports. It is also noticeable that, prior to the initiation of the anti-dumping action, the share of intra-EU suppliers declines, due mainly to the rising share of imports from countries that are subsequently named in anti-dumping petitions and are then subjected to measures. Anti-dumping actions appear to curtail the trend decline in the share of intra-EU imports in the EU market. The share of imports from countries that are named but are then not subjected to measures remains relatively constant both before and after the initiation of the anti-dumping proceeding.

What matters in anti-dumping cases is not just trends in EU imports but also changes in domestic sales by EU firms. However, it is likely that movements in intra-EU trade relative to imports from non-EU members are representative of the competitiveness of EU firms in general and of changes in comparative advantage. It is reasonable to expect that the elasticity of substitution between intra-EU imports and extra-EU imports is very similar to that between domestic sales by EU firms and extra-EU imports. It would be surprising if the ratio of extra-EU imports to domestic sales in the EU were to move in a different direction to the ratio of extra-EU imports to intra-EU imports.

Given this, our analysis would imply that, prior to a request for anti-dumping proceedings, the value of sales by domestic firms remains fairly constant. This then suggests that revenues are unlikely to be falling fast, and therefore begs the question of the extent to which domestic EU firms suffer (economic) injury from the specified imports. Morkre and Kelly (1994) show that, in the US, in most anti-dumping cases domestic firms incur no fall in revenue. If one accepts the link from the performance of EU firms selling in other EU countries to the performance of EU firms in their national domestic market, the results here lead to a similar conclusion for the EU.[9]

The above simple analysis suggests that anti-dumping actions are triggered not by absolute falls in the value or volume of sales by EU firms, but by declining market shares and/or by falling average and relative prices. However, the impact of remedies to the perceived dumping is primarily to increase imports from non-named import suppliers rather than EU suppliers. The discriminatory nature of

[9] Messerlin and Reed (1995) note that confidentiality concerning injury determination means that a specific investigation of this issue is not possible in the EU.

anti-dumping measures leads to trade diversion. The magnitude of this trade diversion is highlighted by the fact that, on average, the total value and volume of imports does not decline in the years after the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation. Trade diversion to other suppliers mitigates the decline in imports from named countries. Any beneficial impact upon complainant EU firms in terms of higher sales and higher prices is reduced, or even eliminated. This implies that the impact of the removal of anti-dumping measures on EU firms will also be dissipated; it will be firms in the rest of the world that will be most affected.

3. An econometric analysis

I now proceed to a more formal analysis of the impact of anti-dumping actions. I investigate import volumes, import prices and then import value shares using a simple model of the evolution of imports similar to that applied by Prusa (1997) to US data. More sophisticated models cannot be used because of the lack of a long time-series of data to provide sufficient variation in prices. The equation estimated is

$$\ln x_{i,t_j} = \alpha + \beta_1 \ln x_{i,t_{j-1}} + \beta_2(\ln x_{i,t-1} - \ln x_{i,t-2}) + \lambda_1 \ln \mathrm{Duty}_i + \lambda_2 \mathrm{Numnamed} + \delta_{1j}\mathrm{td}_j + \delta_{2j}\mathrm{td}_j\mathrm{Dec}_i + \eta_j \mathrm{Year}_{t_j} + \varepsilon_{i,t_j}$$

where $x_{i,t}$ is the volume (price or value share) of imports for case i at time t_j, and where t_0 is the year the action was initiated and $j = 0,\ldots,4$. Duty measures the size of the duty imposed (the ad valorem equivalent of specific duties and the difference between actual and minimum prices). Following Prusa (1997), we include a dummy variable, Numnamed, which takes a value of 1 if the number of named countries exceeds two and zero otherwise. This variable is included to allow for trade diversion to be greater when a larger number of countries are named in an anti-dumping petition. The variables td_j are time dummies taking a value of 1 in year j and 0 otherwise. They are included to capture the impact of anti-dumping investigations on named countries in the years after the investigation is initiated. These variables are then interacted with a decision variable, Dec, which takes a value of 1 if duties are levied. The parameters on these variables should indicate any additional impact upon imports from countries subject to measures. Finally, year dummies are included to control for changes in macroeconomic conditions.

This model is used to investigate the evolution of imports from named countries and imports from non-named countries in total. Separate equations are estimated for imports from countries in the rest of the world and imports from EU partners. For imports from named countries, each case is included. Since there are often a

number of cases for the same product, when estimating equations for imports from non-named countries, we analyse trade for each product and include the average of the duties that are levied. Hence, there are fewer observations in the intra- and extra-EU trade regressions.

Results from estimating this equation on import volumes, import prices (unit values) and import value shares are reported in Tables 1–3, respectively (the coefficients on the year dummies are not presented). Since the data cover a wide range of products with vastly differing levels of imports, I first sought to identify potential outliers. This was done by selecting observations with a studentised residual exceeding two. In all the estimates, the number of observations identified as potential outliers was (surprisingly) relatively small. For example, in the import volume equations 13 out of 490 observations had a studentised residual in excess of two in the named-country regression, whilst 3 out of 235 observations were identified as outliers in the regression for non-named countries. The results presented below are based upon estimation without these observations. Given their small number and the similarity between the estimation with all observations and with the outliers removed, I did not proceed further to bounded influence estimation.

Starting first with the estimations for import volumes (Table 1), the results demonstrate a statistically significant decline in the volume of imports from named countries in the second and third years following the initiation of the action (shown by the coefficients on the dummy variables $t+2$ and $t+3$). For those countries subject to measures, there is a highly significant negative impact on the volume of imports in the EU in the second year after the investigation is announced (the parameter on the variable $t+2 \times$ decision), which is the year in which definitive measures are usually applied. The size of the duty is not a significant determinant of the volume of imports from named countries. I return to discuss this in more detail below.

For the results for import volumes from non-named countries in total, we see that there is a significant (but only at a level of 10%) increase in import volumes for products where a large number of countries (more than two) are named. There is, however, no significant increase in imports in the years following the initiation of the anti-dumping action. The next two columns report separately the results for imports from fellow EU members and for imports from non-named countries in the rest of the world. The results for imports from the EU provide no significant evidence that anti-dumping investigations or the imposition of anti-dumping measures increases import volumes. For non-EU countries, on the other hand, there is a strong and highly significant increase in the volume of imports in the second year after the investigation is announced, which is consistent with the strong fall in imports from named countries subject to measures. There is also evidence that trade diversion to these countries is greater when three or more countries are named in an anti-dumping investigation. This was also found by Prusa (1997) for the US. The results for extra-EU countries have to be treated with

Table 1

Dependent variable: import volumes				
Explanatory variable	Named countries	Non-named countries—Total	Non-named countries—Intra-EU	Non-named countries—Extra-EU
$\ln(x_{t-1})$	1.006 (0.157)***	1.018 (0.150)***	1.014 (0.011)***	1.046 (0.023)***
$\ln(x_{t-1})-\ln(x_{t-2})$	0.034 (0.061)	−0.141 (0.196)	−0.164 (0.107)	−0.045 (0.150)
ln(Duty)	−0.024 (0.027)	0.010 (0.021)	0.016 (0.017)	−0.030 (0.030)
Dummy number named > 2	0.053 (0.068)	0.068 (0.037)*	0.031 (0.038)	0.145 (0.067)**
$t+1$	−0.122 (0.175)	−0.009 (0.084)	−0.091 (0.095)	−0.073 (0.148)
$t+2$	−0.266 (0.140)*	−0.026 (0.095)	0.040 (0.091)	−0.193 (0.129)
$t+3$	−0.380 (0.189)**	−0.065 (0.092)	0.056 (0.081)	−0.097 (0.159)
$t+4$	−0.198 (0.145)	−0.132 (0.097)	−0.099 (0.096)	−0.121 (0.155)
$t+1\times$decision	−0.117 (0.169)	0.001 (0.086)	0.058 (0.094)	0.218 (0.166)
$t+2\times$decision	−0.552 (0.154)***	0.009 (0.110)	−0.117 (0.113)	0.442 (0.144)***
$t+3\times$decision	0.023 (0.191)	0.051 (0.098)	−0.042 (0.081)	0.260 (0.190)
$t+4\times$decision	−0.080 (0.151)	0.112 (0.090)	0.084 (0.090)	0.042 (0.141)
Constant	0.278 (0.276)	−0.341 (0.276)	−0.115 (0.130)	−0.309 (0.270)
R^2	0.931	0.988	0.990	0.967
F	270.11	791.46	915.37	198.86
Observations	477	232	231	231
Reset test	1.85	1.59	1.39	5.50

Observations with a studentised residual greater than 2 (outliers) are excluded. Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in brackets. Year dummies included.

* Significant at 10%.

** Significant at 5%.

*** Significant at 1%.

a degree of caution given that this equation fails the Reset test. There are therefore doubts concerning the specification of this equation and there is the possibility of omitted variable bias.

The next set of results, in Table 2, is from regressions on import prices. All these equations satisfy the specification test. The results do not suggest a significant impact upon the (duty exclusive) price of imports from named countries, except for a negative effect for countries subject to measures in the third and fourth years after the investigation is started. There also appears to be no significant impact of anti-dumping actions on the price of imports from other EU countries. The results for non-named countries in the rest of the world, on the other hand, do suggest that anti-dumping investigations in the EU may have an important impact. There is a significant positive impact on prices in all 4 years following the initiation of an investigation, the effect being particularly large and significant in the second and third years.

The results therefore suggest the possibility that an important effect of anti-dumping investigations in the EU is to raise the price of imports from countries not named in the petition. This may reflect the potential threat of being named in subsequent investigations, which other suppliers seek to avoid by raising their prices. In cases where measures are applied, the price of imports from non-named countries in the rest of the world falls significantly in the third year after the investigation is announced, in concert with the price of imports from the named countries subject to measures.

The final set of results in Table 3 is for import value shares (the share of total imports (intra plus extra)). Here, all the equations fail the Reset test and so we should be more tentative in accepting these results. Bearing this in mind, these regressions suggest that anti-dumping investigations have a significant negative impact on the shares of named countries in the third year after the investigation commences and a very strong negative impact in the second year on the share of named countries subject to measures. There appears to be no significant impact of anti-dumping cases upon the share of imports from other EU countries, but a strong and highly statistically significant impact upon the share of non-named countries in the second year after the investigation is announced, for products where measures are applied.

A common feature from these results is the lack of significance of the parameter on the duty variable: variations in the size of the duty imposed apparently do not contribute to the explanation of the evolution of imports in cases subject to anti-dumping measures. The insignificance of the size of duty is not surprising if demand elasticities vary by product and if high duties tend to be concentrated on relatively price inelastic products, and low duties are applied to price elastic products. A small anti-dumping duty could have a significant impact upon market shares for a price-sensitive product. If anti-dumping actions are used primarily as a tool for preventing imports from causing injury to domestic firms (Eymann and Schuknecht, 1993), then the duty required to avoid a given degree of

Table 2

Dependent variable: import prices (unit values)				
Explanatory variable	Named countries	Non-named countries—Total	Non-named countries—Intra-EU	Non-named countries—Extra-EU
LNG(x_{t-1})	0.994 (0.005)***	0.991 (0.007)***	0.984 (0.007)***	0.992 (0.005)***
$\ln(x_{t-1})-\ln(x_{t-2})$	−0.132 (0.053)**	−0.301 (0.143)**	−0.087 (0.109)	−0.333 (0.103)***
ln(Duty)	0.013 (0.009)	−0.006 (0.013)	−0.013 (0.016)	0.009 (0.011)
Dummy number named > 2	0.023 (0.022)	−0.026 (0.029)	−0.012 (0.030)	−0.014 (0.018)
$t+1$	0.012 (0.031)	0.051 (0.050)	0.058 (0.066)	0.070 (0.041)*
$t+2$	0.022 (0.038)	0.052 (0.050)	−0.029 (0.064)	0.126 (0.046)***
$t+3$	0.045 (0.033)	0.100 (0.060)*	0.022 (0.074)	0.182 (0.048)***
$t+4$	0.044 (0.035)	0.061 (0.061)	0.078 (0.071)	0.101 (0.055)*
$t+1\times$decision	−0.012 (0.038)	−0.010 (0.061)	−0.035 (0.075)	−0.033 (0.047)
$t+2\times$decision	0.011 (0.042)	−0.027 (0.054)	0.041 (0.070)	−0.077 (0.049)
$t+3\times$decision	−0.096 (0.050)*	−0.039 (0.064)	0.004 (0.074)	−0.163 (0.050)***
$t+4\times$decision	−0.097 (0.044)**	−0.022 (0.058)	−0.087 (0.060)	−0.087 (0.055)
Constant	−0.105 (0.060)*	0.101 (0.091)	0.049 (0.093)	−0.039 (0.066)
R^2	0.989	0.993	0.992	0.995
F	2912.94	2004.96	1745.78	2193.48
Observations	477	227	225	228
Reset test	0.65	0.24	0.13	0.93

Observations with a studentised residual greater than 2 (outliers) are excluded. Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in brackets. Year dummies included.

* Significant at 10%.

** Significant at 5%.

*** Significant at 1%.

Table 3

Dependent variable: import value shares			
Explanatory variable	Named countries	Non-named countries—Intra-EU	Non-named countries—Extra-EU
$\ln(x_{t-1})$	1.018 (0.025)***	1.023 (0.039)***	1.057 (0.087)***
$\ln(x_{t-1}) - \ln(x_{t-2})$	0.056 (0.046)	−0.069 (0.083)	−0.062 (0.140)
ln(Duty)	−0.021 (0.032)	0.003 (0.009)	−0.055 (0.032)*
Dummy number named > 2	0.058 (0.074)	0.015 (0.019)	0.062 (0.067)
$t+1$	−0.146 (0.148)	−0.076 (0.071)	−0.165 (0.128)
$t+2$	−0.173 (0.154)	−0.017 (0.044)	−0.201 (0.134)
$t+3$	−0.359 (0.162)**	0.068 (0.058)	0.114 (0.139)
$t+4$	−0.134 (0.163)	0.008 (0.055)	0.124 (0.169)
$t+1\times$decision	−0.061 (0.166)	0.080 (0.075)	0.302 (0.149)**
$t+2\times$decision	−0.472 (0.166)***	0.029 (0.049)	0.480 (0.151)***
$t+3\times$decision	0.043 (0.171)	−0.010 (0.053)	0.195 (0.156)
$t+4\times$decision	−0.072 (0.169)	−0.005 (0.046)	0.086 (0.141)
Constant	−0.008 (0.170)	−0.017 (0.051)	0.212 (0.178)
R^2	0.853	0.860	0.720
F	126.84	72.18	27.13
Observations	481	232	232
Reset test	2.39	3.07	4.73

Observations with a studentised residual greater than 2 (outliers) are excluded. Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in brackets. Year dummies included.

* Significant at 10%.

** Significant at 5%.

*** Significant at 1%.

market disruption (loss of share of domestic firms) will be inversely proportional to the price elasticity of demand.

In addition, EU anti-dumping cases are often characterised by a range of exceptions to the general duty that is levied. Certain firms, usually those that co-operate with the investigation, can be subject to lower duties. In certain cases, mixed measures are applied, with price undertakings being accepted for some firms and duties being applied to other suppliers. We apply the maximum duty relevant to each case, which may not reflect the average impact across firms in the named country. Finally, it may also be that our use of provisional duties for cases subsequently settled by undertakings is inadequate.

This statistical analysis, albeit crude, tends to confirm the impression given by simple analysis of the data. That is, trade diversion resulting from anti-dumping actions is primarily to non-EU countries. In addition, we find that anti-dumping actions can have a significant impact upon the prices of imports from non-named countries in the rest of the world. There are some problems with the chosen specification in certain applications. However, our results are consistent with those of the previous studies by Messerlin (1989) and Prusa (1997), who use different

data sets. Ideally, in future research, a model more consistent with the theory of demand could be applied. This would, however, require data over a sufficiently long period.

4. Conclusions

An important feature of the application of anti-dumping measures in the EU appears to be the diversion of trade away from countries subject to measures to other countries exporting to the EU market. The trade diversion appears to be significant only for imports from non-EU countries. Imports from other EU members are not greatly affected. This conclusion, that anti-dumping actions in the EU cause trade diversion, is consistent with similar studies of the US and studies of the EU using data for a previous period.

Lack of data prevents an analysis of the impact of anti-dumping measures on the firms that petition for the action. However, developments in intra-EU trade may provide a proxy for the impact upon domestic suppliers. If so, then it would appear that these firms are unlikely to benefit from an increased volume of sales or an increase in market share following the levying of anti-dumping measures against particular external suppliers of the EU market. Anti-dumping investigations may curtail the trend decline in market share of domestic firms and appear to affect the price of imports from non-named countries in the rest of the world. Here, we have only been able to look at the (cif) price of imports as they enter the port. It would also be interesting to look at developments in the final selling price of products subject to anti-dumping measures.

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